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Abstract
This article develops a noncooperative bargaining model to address
the effects of the uniform settlements policy (USP) in international
telecommunications. The model predicts that the USP is more likely to
increase (decrease) access charges in markets where, under the USP,
U.S. firms carry more (less) outbound than inbound traffic. This is
due to the model's more general prediction that forbidding price
discrimination may allow an upstream monopolist to credibly commit to a
take-it or leave-it intermediate product price. Two brief case studies
from the international telegraph market lend support to this
prediction.
1. Introduction
In April 1979, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
initiated the first of several actions that are dramatically changing
markets for international telecommunications service. Viewing prices
as excessive in voice markets, the FCC considered two broad policy
options: 1) open formal rate hearings hoping to determine "appropriate"
prices or 2) open entry hoping that competition should hold rates down
to cost. Their decision was to open entry to the greatest extent
possible. 1
Unfortunately, the welfare properties of a perfectly competitive
closed economy cannot be extended to international markets in which the
foreign network is monopoly controlled. Most foreign governments are
likely to maintain their monopolies well into the future with the
consequence that they will remain bottlenecks in the provision of
service. To understand the problems that may arise, consider a typical
market for international service between the U.S. and a particular
foreign country. The foreign monopolist interacts with U.S. carriers
in two ways. First, it serves as an upstream supplier of access to the
foreign network, an input used in fixed proportions by U.S. carriers to
produce calls to the foreign country. Second, it is also a downstream
buyer of access to the U.S. networks. It controls not only the number
of U.S. carriers allowed to access its network, but also the allocation
of U.S. bound traffic across U.S. carriers. These advantages place it
in a relatively strong bargaining position in the negotiations that
determine the division of international revenues. The FCC has long
feared that these advantages might enable the foreign monopolist to set
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access charges so as to extract surplus both from U.S. carriers and
consumers.
To avoid these potential hazards, the Commission enforces the
uniform settlements policy (USP), designed to prevent foreign
monopolists from playing U.S. carriers against one another to obtain
more favorable agreements. The USP requires that 1) all U.S. carriers
pay the same price for access to a particular foreign network, and 2)
the access charge paid by U.S. carriers to a particular foreign
monopolist equals the charge paid by that foreign monopolist to U.S.
carriers. Constraint 1 forbids third degree price discrimination and
is subsequently referred to as the "price discrimination constraint."
Constraint 2 is known as the "50-50 division of tolls."2 This paper
argues that, contrary to the views of the FCC, the USP may result in
higher access charges and higher rates for international service.
Sufficient conditions are given under which the policy is welfare
reducing and welfare enhancing. It turns out the potentially negative
consequences of the policy could arise in the voice market should the
Commission adopt the stringent enforcement stance currently held in
telex. Thus, its recent statements that the policy may be applied in
voice may need to be reassessed. 3
The key to understanding the welfare effects of the USP is to
understand how it affects the degree to which the foreign monopolist
controls the access charges paid and received by U.S. carriers. Due to
the modelling difficulties posed by multilateral bargaining, the usual
approach to the price discrimination problem has been to assume that
the agent on the "thin" side of the market (i.e. the foreign monopolist
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in this case) has all the bargaining power, regardless of the regime. 4
But this begs the question: Why is the monopolist more able to commit
to being a price leader than a particular U.S. carrier when there are
few firms on both sides of the market? In international
telecommunications access charges are subject to negotiations. If U.S.
carriers have any bargaining power it follows that the effects of the
USP on access charges depends partly on how it alters the relative
bargaining powers of foreign and U.S. carriers.
There are two standard ways one might approach the bargaining
problem. One could employ an axiomatic model of bargaining such as the
n-player version of Nash's (1950) bargaining solution (see Roth (1979))
or the Shapley Value (Shapley (1953)), to name just two. In
international telecommunications, however, the mechanism by which
foreign monopolists are thought to play U.S. carriers against one
another relies on the credibility of their threats to take actions
adversely affecting U.S. carriers and ratepayers. A more natural way
to address issues of credibility is to examine an extensive form game.
Employing an extension of the noncooperative bargaining model
first introduced by Rubinstein (1982), I develop a model in which the
bargaining power of the foreign monopolist is endogenous to the policy
regime. The model explicitly incorporates the threat each carrier has
to impose costly delays on those with whom it negotiates as well as the
threat foreign monopolists have to reallocate U.S. bound traffic away
from U.S. carriers refusing their terms. Equilibrium prices reflect
how these threats interact with the USP.
Consider negotiations over the per-minute prices two U.S. carriers
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pay for access to a foreign monopolist's network in order to originate
calls from the U.S. This half of the international market is simply a
wholesale/retail chain in which an upstream monopolist bargains with
downstream oligopolists over the intermediate product price. In the
regime where the discrimination is allowed, the monopolist bargains
with the each U.S. firm over the incremental surplus generated by an
agreement. In general, incremental profits are positive; hence, each
U.S. firm can impose a loss on the monopolist by terminating service
and therefore has bargaining power. The model thus predicts that the
monopolist does not exercise price leadership in subgame perfect
equilibrium when discrimination is allowed. When price discrimination
is forbidden, in contrast, U.S. carriers cannot bargain over
incremental surplus once an initial price is established. This allows
the monopolist to credibly set a take-it or leave-it price, leading to
strictly higher access charges and strictly lower welfare than when
discrimination is allowed.
Although the models are quite different, this result bears a
family resemblance to the conjecture of Coase (1972) formalized by
Bulow (1982), Stokey (1981), and Gul, Sonnenscein and Wilson (1986): A
durable good monopolist unable to credibly refrain from lowering price
after making initial "high" priced sales may end up lowering price to
marginal cost very quickly to prevent buyers from waiting too long to
purchase the good. In those models the monopolist can benefit from
committing itself not to lower price below the static monopoly price.
In the bargaining model the "durable goods" are access charge contracts
sold to multiple U.S. firms with symmetric reservation price schedules.
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The mechanism precluding price leadership in the unconstrained regime
is not the incentive for the monopolist to lower price; rather, it is
the monopsony power held by each buyer. By committing itself not to
discriminate in price the monopolist can play buyers against one
another to determine the equilibrium price. This restores monopoly
price leadership.
This result is applied to the international telecommunications
market by introducing into the model two way traffic and incorporating
the 50-50 division of tolls. Changes in the uniform access charge (one
satisfying both the price discrimination constraint as well as the 50-
50 division of tolls) affect both the foreign monopolist's marginal
cost of outbound traffic as well as its revenues from .inbound traffic.
Thus, whether it raises the uniform access charge above its marginal
cost depends on the relative importance of its inbound and outbound
traffic. For the intermediate case in which the total demand for U.S.
outbound calls is independent of the foreign price and technologies are
the same in each country, the USP raises U.S. welfare when the number
of calls originating overseas is greater than that originating in the
U.S. This is the case in most telex markets. However, when traffic
patterns are reversed, as they are in most voice and telegraph markets,
foreign monopolists set relatively high uniform access charges. This
may result in lower U.S. welfare than in the unconstrained regime.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background on USP and gives two examples suggesting that the
policy may be failing to meet its objectives in the telegraph market.
Section 3 develops the model and examines subgame perfect equilibrium
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access charges in the unconstrained regime. Section 4 introduces the
USP. Section 5 compares equilibrium welfare in constrained and
unconstrained regimes. Section 6 offers some concluding comments.
2. Background
The three international telecommunications services addressed by
this paper are voice (i.e international long distance calls), telex,
and telegraph. Although it was monopolized by AT&T until 1985, the
entry of MCI and Sprint has raised the question of whether the USP
should be enforced in voice. In its recent Order on Reconsideration
(FCC 1987), the Commission tentatively ruled that the policy applies,
though with a weaker waiver procedure than in telex and telegraph
markets.5 In any case, AT&T still controls most of this market so it
may be too early to learn much by examining data. However, the USP
originated in telex and telegraph markets where rivalry has existed
throughout their history. A brief examination of this history provides
insight into the effects of the USP in telex and telegraph as well as
suggesting potential effects in voice.
The FCC has been very clear about the intended consequences of the
USP. They state: "Our primary responsibility...is to facilitate the
development of a competitive marketplace characterized by lower rates
and greater service/carrier options for users."6 In pursuit of this
goal, they have long feared that unrestrained competition among U.S.
firms in telex and telegraph markets might do more harm than good.
Frequently, this fear has led them to prevent U.S. firms from signing
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international agreements that they thought were contrary to the public
interest. The first example was in 1936 when they refused to allow
Mackay Radio and Telegraph to go into operation between the U.S. and
Norway. In the proposed contract, the Norwegian monopolist had agreed
to route all new U.S. bound telegraph traffic over Mackay's new
circuit. The FCC argued:
"Inasmuch as the [foreign) telegraph administration controls
every word of outgoing radiotelegraph traffic, the competing
American radio companies would be dependent upon it for their
traffic.. .Each would be interested in increasing its share of
the total traffic. To expect the telegraph administration to
play the competing companies against each other is simply to
expect that the administration will be headed by good
business men, loyal to their national interests. To rely
upon companies which are bitter competitors not to make
concessions to the administration which controls all outgoing
radiotelegraph traffic is to provide an egceedingly tenuous
basis upon which to rest public interest"
The Commission's basic fear was that the Norwegian PTT would "whipsaw"
U.S. firms into paying more for access to the Norwegian network while
accepting less for access to their own. This, they argued, would put
upward pressure on the price of final service.
Two potential threats that foreign monopolists might use have been
cited. As in the Mackay case a PTT might threaten to divert
(profitable) U.S. bound traffic from one U.S. carrier to another if the
first carrier does not agree to new access charges. Alternatively, a
PTT might threaten to terminate, permanently or temporarily, its
operating agreement with any U.S. carrier refusing to accept less
favorable terms. The USP developed as an informal, but generally
observed, policy in the 1930s as a way in which to address these-
threats. It wasn't until 1977, however, when a U.S. telex carrier
attempted to enter the U.S./U.K market at a lower access charge than
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currently in effect, that the policy was more formally considered by
the Commission. By 1980 they argued that "this Commission has long
maintained a policy of uniformity to preclude 'whipsawing' of U.S.
carriers by foreign correspondents. The policy protects the interest
of the U.S. and, in particular, the U.S. ratepayer from the adverse
effects 'whipsawing' can produce."8
The puzzling aspect of this and many similar Commission statements
is that they never fully describe how the USP benefits U.S. ratepayers.
The implicit assumption is that forbidding price discrimination and
requiring a 50-50 division of tolls prevents foreign monopolists from
credibly threatening (or carrying out threats) to take actions
adversely affecting U.S. ratepayers. Yet, neither the threat to
reallocate U.S. bound traffic nor the threat to terminate operating
agreements is directly affected by either constraint.
Under the USP, any U.S. carrier reaching agreement to operate at
access charges in violation of either the price discrimination
constraint or the 50-50 division of tolls must file a request for
waiver of the USP with the FCC. After reviewing any objections filed
by other carriers, the Commission determines whether a waiver of the
USP is in the public interest. Citing its "long standing policy of
uniformity," it has become standard practice for the Commission to
reject waiver requests in both the telex and telegraph markets.9
Hence, individual carriers proposing non-uniform access charges are
usually required to bring agreements into line with existing agreements
before being granted the right to begin (or renew) service. The US?
therefore prevents the foreign monopolist from playing U.S. carriers
9
against one another by sequentially altering individual agreements
after an initial agreement is established.
What is missing from the argument, however, is a description of
how the initial agreement is established. The policy clearly does not
prevent the foreign monopolist from threatening to terminate the
operating agreements or adjust the U.S. bound traffic.of all U.S. firms
simultaneously. 0On two recent occasions foreign monopolists have
unilaterally increased uniform access charges to the detriment of U.S.
consumers. It is instructive to examine these two cases.
Case 1: The COMTELCA Telegram
In 1983 a consortium of Central American countries known as
COMTELCA sent a telegram to each U.S. telegraph carrier announcing that
on a given date they would put new higher access charges into effect in
the market for telegraph service between the U.S. and each COMTELCA
country. The threat used was their assertion that "thereafter, they
would deal only with those carriers agreeing to the new charge." 1 2
Following the waiver procedure, each U.S. carrier in succession
filed a petition with the FCC for waiver of the USP to increase the
access charge applicable for service to each COMTELCA country.
Subsequently, all the U.S. telegraph carriers operating in these
markets sent the COMTELCA administrations a joint telex informing them
that the signatories had agreed to the new access charge effective
November 1, 1983. Since no U.S. carrier objected to the new charge,
the proposed change was allowed by the FCC.
Prior to the change, U.S. carriers paid $.1773 per word for access
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to each COMTELCA network. After the change they paid $.2365 per word.
While final service prices rose only a few percentage points in each
market, the net revenues of all U.S. carriers combined (i.e. net of
payments to the COMTELCA countries) fell by 28 percent from 1982 to
1984.13
Case 2: The CEPT Telegram
In another instance, on August 19, 1983, RCA Global Communications
filed a request with the FCC for waiver of the uniform settlements
policy in order to raise the access charge for telegraph traffic
between the U.S. and 13 CEPT countries. Other U.S. carriers filed
similar waiver requests. Each had received a telegram from CEPT that
read:
"If...your agreement cannot be obtained, we will be
forced... to reconsider the agreement reached by us up to the
present time and we will take measures for a new breakdown of
the traffic and Jgerefore a radical change in the
infrastructure."
Notice that both the threat to terminate operating agreements and to
reallocate outbound traffic was used by CEPT. The access charge paid
by U.S. carriers increased from $.1577 per word to $.2365 per word on
January 1, 1984.
In both the CEPT and COMTELCA telegrams foreign monopolists were
able to raise all access charges simultaneously by using the threats
that the USP was designed to address. The fact that every U.S. carrier
agreed to the proposed price in each case implies that these threats
were credible. The implication is that, had some U.S. carrier rejected
the telegram, the outcome of the ensuing negotiations (i.e. "the
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radical change in infrastructure") would have been no better for that
carrier than accepting the terms in the telegram. The next section
offers a model of these negotiations. Although the model is designed
to address international telecommunications, it should be apparent that
many vertical chains of production share similar features.
3. A Bargaining Model of International Settlements.
The Model
Consider an international telecommunications market in which a
foreign monopolist, M, and two symmetric U.S. carriers, firms 1 and 2,
bargain over the price each pays for a continuous flow of the
intermediate product, access to the foreign network.16 Access is used
by each carrier in fixed proportions to produce a continuous flow of
the final product, calls to the foreign country. The foreign
monopolist produces access at constant marginal cost c; it produces
U
outbound calls via firm i's network at marginal cost c + ai where c is
U
the unit cost of service due to other competitively sold inputs and a.
is the price paid for access to firm i's network. Similarly, firm i
produces access at constant marginal cost w s c and outbound calls at
marginal cost w + a.. The assumption that U.S. marginal cost is no
higher than that of the foreign monopolist reflects the belief that
private U.S. firms are at least as efficient as their foreign publicly-
owned counterparts. Initially, there is no constraint on access
U U U K M K U K
charges; under the USP, 1 - a 2 - a , a 1 - a 2 - a ,and a - a.
Conditional on negotiated access charges firms are assumed to
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maximize their instantaneous profit flows at every instant on into
perpetuity. This reflects the observation that access charges are
usually fixed for a long period of time, while decisions regarding
levels of service are made continuously. U.S. firms are Cournot
duopolists in the market for calls originating in the U.S.; the foreign
carrier continuously produces its monopoly level of service. All firms
discount the future continuously at the common rate 6 - e-rz < 1 where
r is the interest rate and z is the length of time between successive
offers in the bargaining game introduced below. To reflect the belief
that costs due to bargaining frictions are small relative to the
discounted value of profits earned after agreement is reached,
attention is focused on the "frictionless" case in which z - 0 (6-+1).
The model is one of complete information - demand, cost functions, and
the discount factors are assumed to be common knowledge.
Turning to the demand side of the market, the gross U.S. benefits
of telecommunications service are given by WU (X,y) where X is the
amount of service originated in the U.S., y the amount originated
overseas. Similarly, the gross foreign benefits of service are
WM(X,y). Both functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable.
To simplify the exposition it is assummed that WU WM - 0; i.e.,
xy xy
gross surplus is additively seperable in inbound and outbound
service. Let the inverse demand for service outbound from the U.S. be
P(X) - W(X,y); let that for service outbound from the foreign country
x
be F(y) - WM(X,y).
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Welfare Maximization
The FCC has expressed both the desire to maintain "lower rates"
for users and to ensure that "U.S. carriers rather than foreign
administrations maximize their revenues through accounting rate [i.e.
access charge] actions." This is captured by assuming that the
Commission's goal is to maximize welfare, which is taken to be a
weighted sum of U.S. consumer and producer surplus.
The USP affects welfare through its affect on access charges.
Assuming no other instruments are available, the benchmark outcome to
compare with other equilibria is that in which the Commission chooses
access charges to maximize welfare subject to monopoly pricing overseas
and Cournot pricing in the U.S. Let X(aM) be the Cournot
equilibrium level of service in the U.S., y(aU) the monopoly level of
service overseas. U.S. welfare is
(1) US(a ,aU ) - WU (X(aM),y(aU)) - P(X a ))X(aM)
+ a P(X(aM')X(aM _-(aM + w)X(aM) + aU - w)y(aU
where 0 s a s 1. To maximize welfare the commission solves
MU M U(2) max (US(a ,a) |a >c, a 2 w).
The requirement that the access charges be greater than marginal cost
in (2) reflects the assumption that carriers can refuse to accept
unprofitable inbound traffic. While one can imagine carriers
contemplating agreements to continue service at prices less than
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marginal cost, there would be incentives for each carrier to reduce
inbound traffic by blocking circuits or quality degradation. That is,
such agreements would be inherently unstable.
The first order necessary conditions to (2) are
(3) [(1 - a)PxX - a(P - (a + w))]X - aX + A - 0
xa




(5) (a - c)A - 0, (a - w) - 0, A > 0, , > 0.
Let the subscript OPT denote access charges that solve problem (2).
M
Since the first term in (3) is negative, it is clear that aOPT - c.
M
Intuitively, the Commission sets a as low as possible to increase U.S.
profits and consumer surplus, while disregarding foreign profits.
U
Whether aOPT is greater than or equal to w depends on the whether the
U
marginal profit to U.S. carriers from increasing a above w (ay(w))
is greater than or less than the marginal reduction in the call
externality (W (y(w))ya(w)). These two possibilities are illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2. Notice that in either case U.S. consumer surplus
declines as the uniform access charge increases along the 45 degree
line in access charge space. Hence, the access charge increases in
the CEPT and COMTELCA telegrams reduced consumer welfare in this model.
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The Unconstrained Regime: Outbound Traffic
In the unconstrained regime (UR), in which neither the price
discrimination constraint nor the 50-50 division of tolls is enforced,
negotiations over the access charges for inbound and outbound traffic
need not be carried out simultaneously. That is, the foreign
monopolist and firm i might negotiate the charge paid for access to the
foreign network having already agreed upon that paid for access to firm
i's network. Alternatively, some U.S. firmnmight reach agreement to
carry only one-way traffic, in which case there is only one charge
under negotiation for that firm.18 Unless firms can commit to link the
decisions to originate and receive traffic, each is essentially
involved in two bargaining problems to determine two access charges.
Consider first the market for traffic originating in the U.S.
Bargaining proceeds as a sequence of offer/counteroffer and
accept/reject decisions in pair-wise meetings between the monopolist
and each U.S. firm. In the Order on Reconsideration (FCC, 1987), the
FCC clearly expressed fears concerning the advantage held by the
foreign monopolist in negotiations with multiple U.S. firms. These
fears are captured in the bargaining model by assuming an asymmetry in
the sequence of moves that gives the monopolist an advantage. In
particular, the monopolist can temporarily terminate negotiations with
one firm in order to begin negotiations with the other as long as
neither firm has reached agreement. However, once an initial agreement
has been reached, the monopolist bargains more symmetrically with the
remaining U.S. firm. The idea is that the monopolist attempts to play
U.S. firms against one another prior to reaching an initial agreement,
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but then bargains bilaterally with the remaining firm thereafter.
The formal structure of the game, illustrated in Figure 3, is the
following. In period zero, one of the U.S. firms, say i, is randomly
chosen to meet with the monopolist. During this meeting, the
monopolist offers a price; firm i may accept or reject that price. If
the offer is rejected, the monopolist chooses whether to 1) open
negotiations with firm j firm next period, in which case the monopolist
makes an offer to firm j, or 2) consider firm i's counter-offer next
period. As long as agreement has not been reached, bargaining
continues with the monopolist determining which firm to negotiate with.
If an agreement is reached at time t, the firm in agreement begins
operations at the (downstream) monopoly level of service, and the
foreign monopolist continues negotiations with the remaining firm at
time t+i. In this subgame firms alternate offers each period with the
monopolist making the first offer. Upon reaching the second agreement,
each U.S. firm begins producing its Cournot Nash equilibrium output.
The game continues in this way until both U.S. firms have reached
agreement.19 The formal asymmetries, then, are the monopolist's
ability to control the timetable of offers and to make the opening
offer in each meeting.
Following the usual procedure, a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
will be derived by proceeding left on each branch of the game tree,
using backward induction. Consider the subgame after the monopolist
and firm j agree to begin service at the price a before firm i has
reached agreement. At time t, firm j begins producing the (downstream)
monopoly output, x (a ), allowing the foreign monopolist to earn
17
an instantaneous profit flow equal to Um(a) - (a - c) xmCaj). At
time t + 1, the monopolist makes an offer to firm i. Since it is
already earning profits from firm j, the payoff to the monopolist
from reaching agreement with firm i is the incremental profit obtained
by moving from monopoly to Cournot equilibrium in the U.S. Let
x (a , a) be the Cournot equilibrium output of firm i when the
monopolist and firm i agree on the price ai. Letting U be the
incremental profits earned by the foreign monopolist by agreeing with
firm i, and i the incremental (and absolute) profits of firm i,
K M =M KM M + M -M a
(6) U1 (ai aj) - (ai - c) xi(aiaj) + (a - c) (x(aai) - xm(aJ))
and
K M M MMM MM
(i7,a ) -P(x(aa ) + x (a ,a )) xi(a ,a )
- (a i + w) xi(a ,aM).
The total profit earned by the monopolist is
(8)MK M K M + KM KM
(8) U(a 15 a2 ) - (a1 - c)x(aa 2 ) +(a 2  -c)x 2 (a 2 a)
Assuming continuous discounting at the interest rate r, the discounted
present value (discounted to time t) of the profit streams earned by
the monopolist and firm j are
18
(9)




where x (aM) - P(xM(a xm(a ) - (w + a ) xj(a ). In what follows,
statements such as "the monopolist receives (1 - 6)U m+SU" are taken
to mean that it earns (1 - 6)Um/r + SU/r in present value.
Let
A(a ) - {a | Ui(aa,a_), (aa0) > 0 BUi(a a ) 2 }
ai
be the set of all individually rational access charges over which the
monopolist and firm i have a conflict of interest. The following
assumptions are made on profit functions.
Assumption 1.
Assumption 2.
(Existence of individually rational trades). For all
a a c, there exists some ai e A(a.) such that
U 
)
U aa) i (a ,a) >0
(Continuity) ii, m' , Um are twice continuously
differentiable on the interval [c,e).
(Monotonicity) x is strictly decreasing in a1 ,
wm is strictly decreasing in a, and
19
I81r/Oai| > |aw /8a | where both derivatives are
bounded.
Assumption 4. (Monotonicity) U is strictly quasiconcave in (a ,a2)'
and Um is strictly quasiconcave.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the monopolist and firm i find it
profitable to reach an agreement. Assumptions 3 and 4 ensure that
the set A(a ) is convex and that the firm paying the lower price
earns higher profits in Cournot equilibrium.
Define the functions VM and V as follows:
(11) VMa,a,) - min ( a ',a ) 6U (aia7)
M iji ji J -
M M M
(12) Vi(aiaj) - max ( a' e A(a ) |i M(a',aM) 2 6wi(ai,a ) )
VM (Vi) is the lowest (highest) input price which, if agreed upon
today, would leave the monopolist (firm i) at least as well off as it
would be by agreeing to the input price, ai, tomorrow.
While Assumptions 1 - 4 guarantee existence, the following
guarantees uniqueness in the subgame after one firm has reached
agreement.
Assumption 5. (Increasing compensation for delay) For k e (i,M),
the functions Dk a, a ) = a - Vk a, a ) are
strictly increasing in a.
20
Assumption 5 asserts that the increase (decrease) in the input
price necessary to compensate the monopolist (firm i) for a delay of
one period increases as the profitability to the monopolist (firm i)
of that input price increases. Assumptions 1 - 5 are standard
assumptions made in two-player alternating offer bargaining models. 2 0
While they do not include all cases of interest, one can show that
they are satisfied in the present model under many downstream demand
conditions including that of linear demand.
Equilibrium in the Market for Outbound Traffic
First, the equilibrium to the subgame just described is
characterized. Given Assumptions 1 - 5, the following Lemma is
a direct consequence of the results in Rubinstein (1982).
Lemma1. Define the following functions:
(13) f(a,aj) = argmax ri (a',a) s.t. U(a a) > 6Ui(aa )
a' E A(a )
(14) k(a,a ) - argmax U (a',a ) s.t. fi(a',a ) 6-i(a,a )
a' e A(a )
(15) S(a) - k(f(S(a ),a ),a )), R(a ) - f(S(a ),a ).
Under Assumptions 1 - 5, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
to the subgame after an initial agreement is reached in which the
price S(a ) is agreed upon immediately.
21
The intuition for why S and R are SPE offers is straightforward.
Observe that, conditional on firms always expecting S or R to be
accepted whenever they are offered, the best the monopolist (resp. firm
i) can do in each period in which it makes an offer is to offer an
access charge maximizing its incremental profits subject to leaving
firm i (resp. the monopolist) just indifferent between accepting, or
waiting for the offer expected next period. It is easy to see that the
offers in Lemma 1 satisfy these intuitive conditions. This completes
the analysis of the subgame.
Proceeding backwards, the next step is to use Lemma 1 to derive
equilibrium strategies in the subgames before either firm has reached
agreement. Attention is restricted to stationary subgame perfect
equilibria (SSPE) in which, if no agreement has been reached by time t,
* A
all firms expect an agreement at time t+l. Let a (resp. a) be the
SSPE offer of the monopolist (resp. each U.S. firm) in every period
before an initial agreement is reached. By agreeing to the offer
a' in period t, firm i receives (discounted to period t)
(16) (1 - 6)Rm(a') + 6x (a',S(a')),
since it earns monopoly profits for one period and expects firm j to
agree to the price S(a') in period t + 1. If it rejects a' firm i's
expected profit depends on whether the monopolist continues negotiating
with i or begins negotiating with firm j next period. If the
monopolist switches to firm j, firm i receives
22
) 2* *(17) 2 i (S(a ),a )
2*
since it expects firm j to agree to a in period t + 1 and then to
agree to the Rubinstein equilibrium price in period t + 2. Hence, the
best price the monopolist can receive in a SSPE in which it is
switching is
*
(18) h(a ) - argmax (1 - 6)Um(a') + 6U(a',S(a'))
a' > c
** * 2*
s.t. (1 - 6)im(a)+ 6w (a ,S(a )) §.:f (S(a ),a )
Alternatively, suppose the monopolist does not switch. Then the
best price firm i can induce the monopolist to accept is
(19) g(a ) - argmax (1 - 6)wmr(a') + 6iri(a' ,S(a'))
a' >_ c
* * *
s.t. (1 - 6)Um(a') + 6U(a',S(a')) 6((l- 6)Um(a ) + 6U(a ,S(a ))]
The following regularity condition ensures that the present value of
firm i's profits are nonincreasing. 2 1
Asump.t-on 6. IS'I < 1 and lim IS'I < 1.
6-
Since the present value of the monopolist' s profits are nondecreas ing
in the range of prices over which there is a conflict of interest,
* *
the constraint in (19) along with Assumption 6 implies that g(a ) < a;
hence , in SSPE the monopolist always chooses to switch whenever its
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offer is rejected. In equilibrium we thus have
* * A *
(20) a - h(a ); a - g(a )
To examine equilibrium in the frictionless case in which 6 - 1,
we employ the following technical Lemma which is proved in the
Appendix.
Lemma 2. There is some 6' such that, for all 6 e [6',1), the
constraints in problems (13), (14), and (18) are binding in SSPE.
* K
As 6 -+ 1 suppose that a -aUR and S(e) -* T(.). Applying Lemma 2,
the constraint in (18) implies that
M M K M
(21) fi(aU,T(aU)) - (T(a),a)
By Assumption 3, this implies that a - T(aM).
It remains to examine S as 6 - 1. Consider problems (13) and
(14). Expanding the RHS of both constraints about the price on the LHS
of each constraint yields
aU( (t,a )/a 1 - 6) 1
(22) K










for some t, v e [R,S]. Since the LHS of (23) is bounded, R -* S as
6 -+ 1, and therefore t and v also converge to the same price.
Hence, multiplying (22) by (23) and taking the limit as 6 + 1 yields
au (Tia)M(24) U ai ) i (T,a ) +
a
8wi(T,ai) Ui(T,a ) - 0.
8a.
I-
Since T - a in the limiting equilibrium, we have
j
MProposition 1. Let a be a
regime. Then a solves
limiting SSPE price in the unconstrained
M M M M
(25) BU(a[ , a ( , ) + ia ,am U ( - 0
aai R (i , 11 O ' H RI
8 Oaii jaaa
To interpret the limiting equilibrium, observe Figure 4, where the
functions Ti(aj) = T(a ), i e (1,2) and the profit contours of the
foreign monopolist are illustrated in access charge space. Define the
access charge at which the foreign monopolist exercises price
leadership in the market for U.S. originated traffic as
(26) aL - argmax (U(a,a) a > c).
From (25), it is clear that 8Ui/8aj > 0 in SSPE; hence, T intersects
Lthe 45 degree line below aL, as shown in the figure.
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The key idea is that when the time between offers is small, firm i
rejects offers greater than Ti(ai) if it then expects firm j to agree
to ai next period. For, after rejecting such an offer, i expects to
wait a very short time before receiving a lower price, Ti(a ), a short
time later. Similarly, the monopolist rejects offers from i less than
T i(a ) if it then expects to agree to a next period. These two
conditions, along with the condition that the agent chosen to propose
makes an offer maximizing its profits subject to expecting acceptance,
imply that the only SSPE offers are given by a,, the price at which T
intersects T2 .
Since, a < aL, the monopolist does not exercise price leadership
in the SSPE to the bargaining game. It is prevented from doing so by
each U.S. firm's ability to credibly reject a high price, expecting to
agree to a lower price a short time later. This threat is credible
because the second firm to reach agreement has bargaining power. That
is, given an agreement between the monopolist and firm i, adding firm j
shifts out the derived demand for access to the monopolist's network,
creating additional surplus over which the monopolist and firm j
bargain. It should not be surprising that the monopolist generally
does not receive all the surplus in this phase of the negotiation, and
therefore, that forward looking U.S. firms do not accept inordinately
high prices early in the negotiations before either has reached
agreement. 2 2
The Unconstrained Regime: Inbound Traffic
Next, consider the market for traffic terminating in the U.S. The
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foreign monopolist controls the allocation of U.S. bound traffic across
U.S. carriers and can shift among them instantaneously at almost no
cost, provided each U.S. carrier's capacity is not constrained. But
capacity is readily available, and it appears that firms can increase
it very quickly to handle potentially profitable inbound traffic. 2 3
Except for the fact that there is only one buyer, this is a classic
example of Bertrand competition with U.S. firms competing for foreign
inbound traffic. It is well known that, if sellers have constant
marginal cost, no capacity constraints, and face downward sloping
market demand, the unique Bertrand equilibrium access charge equals
marginal cost.
It turns out that a noncooperative bargaining model similar to
that in Figure 3 yields the Bertrand equilibrium as its unique SSPE.
Intuitively, suppose the monopolist offers the price w in every period
and switches after either firm rejects this offer. Since the
monopolist decides which U.S. firm carries its traffic after access
charges have been negotiated, it will never agree to a higher access
charge in the subgame after agreeing to w. Hence, neither U.S. firm
has any incentive to reject w, since it cannot obtain a better
alternative by waiting.
Proposition 2. In the unconstrained regime, the equilibrium price paid
Ufor access to the U.S. network is a. - w.
An interesting property of the equilibria described in
Propositions 1 and 2 is their relationship to the axiomatic bargaining
27
model of Nash (1950). Assuming that the frontier of the set
((Ui,ri ) I Ui - Ui(ai,ai), i a - r(ai,aj))
is concave, Binmore (1986) has shown that the price T(a ) satisfies
Nash's axioms in the bilateral bargaining problem between firm i and
the monopolist. It is not difficult to show that, in international
M U
markets with two-way traffic, the prices (a , a) satisfy Nash's
axioms in the bilateral bargaining between the monopolist and each U.S.
carrier simultaneously.
4. Bargaining Under the USP
It is useful to begin the analysis of the USP by considering only
the price discrimination constraint in the market for traffic
originating in the U.S. Prior to the initial agreement, negotiations
proceed in the same way as in the unconstrained regime. After an
initial agreement is reached with firm j, however, the only decision
made by the monopolist and firm i is whether to begin service at the
access charge already established in the first agreement.
Casual arguments at the Commission suggest that the price
discrimination constraint should make it more difficult for the foreign
monopolist to exercise any advantages it might have in negotiating
access charges. The following Proposition, however, argues that just
the opposite is true in the noncooperative bargaining model of this
paper.
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Proposition 3. Suppose price discrimination is forbidden in the market
for traffic originating in the U.S. Then, as 6 -. 1, the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium access charge approaches aL. That is, the foreign
monopolist exercises price leadership.
L
Proof: Define a6 by
(27). a - argmax ((1 - 6)U (a) + 6U(a, a) a c)
Existence is demonstrated by constructing the equilibrium.
Consider the following strategies. The monopolist plans to offer
L L
a6 in every period, to switch whenever either U.S. firm refuses a6,
A
and to accept any offer greater than or equal to a, where
A
(28) a - argmax (1 - S)irm(a) + 6,(a, a) s.t.
a > c
L L L
(1 - 6)Um(a) + 6U(aa) > 6[(1 - 6 )Um(a6 ) + 6U(a 6 ,a6 )
^ L
Each U.S. firm offers a and accepts offers less than or equal to a6 .
Observe that, since bargaining effectively ends after an initial
L
agreement is reached, neither U.S. firm can credibly reject a6 given
the monopolist's strategy. For, by doing so, it expects to agree to
the same price two periods later. Clearly, the monopolist has no
incentive to offer a higher price, and it receives at least as much
^ L
by accepting a at time t as it does by waiting for a6at time t+l.
L L
Hence, these are SPE strategies. As 6 + 1, a6 -+ a.
The proof of uniqueness is less intuitive and therefore is'
presented in the appendix. Q.E.D.
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Consider the mechanism transferring price setting power to the
foreign monopolist. There are two phases of the negotiations. Phase
one is all the subgames beginning in periods before an initial
agreement is reached. Phase two is the subgame after- an initial
agreement is reached. In the unconstrained regime, the monopolist is
not a price leader in the market for traffic originating in the U.S.
because each firm has bargaining power in phase two. The price
discrimination constraint, however, provides the monopolist with a
credible commitment not to bargain in phase two. Since it has all the
bargaining power in phase one, this allows it to credibly commit to a
take-it or leave-it price.
Let us now turn to the regime in which the USP is enforced in
markets with two-way traffic. The proof of Proposition 3 relies on two
factors present when the price discrimination constraint is enforced.
First, by switching after either U.S. firm rejects an offer, the
monopolist effectively makes all the offers in the phase of the game
prior to the initial agreement. Second, the price discrimination
constraint prevents bargaining from occurring in the subgame after the
initial agreement is reached. It should be apparent that neither
factor is affected by introducing two-way traffic and the 50-50
division of tolls into the model. That is, define
(29) U(a) - F(y(a))y(a) - (a + c)y(a) + (a - c)X(a)
to be the monopolist's equilibrium profits under the USP, and let a
maximize U subject to a a c. An argument nearly identical to that
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presented in the proof of Proposition 3 implies
Proposition 4. Under the USP, the foreign monopolist sets the take-it
M4*
or leave-it uniform access charge a in the unique (limiting) SPE of
the bargaining model.
Noncooperative bargaining models of this sort are not known for
being robust to small changes in the structure of the game. One might
suspect, therefore, that the ability of the monopolist to unilaterally
set the access charge under the USP is due to the advantage it has in
always making the first offer after switching. I have also considered
an alternative game in which the identity of the proposer in each
period is chosen randomly. In this game, each offer is a vector,
(a,pi) where p is firm i's proposed share of U.S. inbound traffic.
Subgame perfect equilibria under the USP rely heavily on the
monopolist's threat to divert traffic away from U.S. carriers refusing
to agree. It turns out that this threat is always enough to allow the
monopolist to set a take-it or leave-it uniform access charge in a
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium when the USP is enforced.2 4
The advantage of the present model is that it straightforwardly
illustrates the role the USP plays in providing the monopolist with a
credible commitment. By assumption, the sequence of moves is such that
the monopolist has more bargaining power than U.S. firms before the
first agreement is reached. Hence, it is not necessary to consider the
effects of allowing the monopolist to threaten to divert traffic away
from U.S. firms refusing to agree in order to get monopoly price
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leadership in equilibrium under the USP. In the more symmetric game in
which U.S. firms make "half" of all the offers before an initial
agreement is reached, this threat becomes important. In either case,
however, the monopolist has the advantage early in the negotiations
before the first agreement is reached. The role of the USP is to
provide it with a commitment not to engage in more symmetric bargaining
in the subgame after reaching that agreement.
5. The Price, Profit, and Welfare Effects of the USP
The main utility of Proposition 4 is that it allows the welfare
effects of the USP to be studied by examining a simple constrained
optimization problem. The foreign monopolist solves
(30) max (F(y(a)) y(a) - (a + c) y(a) + (a - c) X(a) a c)
Recognizing that y(a) is the optimal foreign level of service for any
a, the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are
_ M* M* M* _ X(a M*_
(31) -y(a ) + X(a ) + (a -c) aa + A - 0,
M* M4*
A 0, a - c >0, A(a - c) - 0.
14*
Since 8X/Oa < 0, the -nstraint binds (a - c) whenever
M4* M*
X(a ) < y(a ). Hence, the USP lowers the uniform access charge to
foreign marginal cost in markets where the net flow of traffic is
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inbound to the U.S. Interestingly, this unambiguously improves welfare
over the unconstrained regime whenever w - c. (See Figure 5). Thus,
there is a normative justification for the USP in markets where, under
the USP, the net traffic flow is inbound to the U.S.
M* M4*
When X(a ) > y(a ), the constraint in (30) no longer binds; i.e.
M4* M4*
a > c. Whether a is higher or lower than a depends on the
relative volumes of U.S. outbound and inbound traffic. To see this,
introduce the shift parameter a > 0 into the derived demand for access
to the U.S. network by writing it as y(a,a), where ay/8a > 0, y -+ ec as
a -+ Co, and y(a,O) - 0. As a approaches zero, foreign outbound traffic
M* L
falls to zero, and a (a) approaches a . As a grows large, foreign
M4*
outbound traffic grows relative to U.S. outbound traffic, and a
14 M* M
approaches c. If c > a for all a, then a (a) > a for all a. If c
M L M4*
< a < a , then assuming that a (a) is continuous there is some a'
M4* M4 1*
such that a (a') - a . Since a (a) is monotonically decreasing in
25 M4* 14
a, it follows that for all a < a', a (a) > a,.
Since final product price is an increasing function of the uniform
access charge in Cournot equilibrium, these conclusions can be
summarized as follows.
Proposition 5. Suppose w - c. Then the uniform settlements policy
reduces the price of U.S. service whenever, under the USP, the volume
of traffic originating overseas is greater than the volume originating
in the U.S. When w < c the effects of the US? are uncertain. However,
if U.S. inbound traffic is low enough relative to its outbound traffic,
then the US? raises the price of U.S. service.
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Next, consider the effects of the USP on U.S. profits. When X < y
and w - c, the USP increases the profits of U.S. firms. This follows
because the charge for access to the U.S. network equals marginal cost
in either regime, while that paid by U.S. carriers in the unconstrained
regime ( U) is higher than that paid under the USP (c). On the other
hand, there are some values of a for which the USP raises U.S. price
but also raises the profits of U.S. firms. This follows because when a
- a', the USP raises the access charge paid to U.S. firms (from c to
M
aUR) but leaves the charge they pay unchanged. As a falls, however,
the loss in profits due to the resulting increase in marginal cost
eventually outweighs any gains in revenues from inbound traffic.
These arguments are summarized as
Proposition 6. Suppose w - c. Then the uniform settlements policy
increases the profits of U.S. firms whenever, under the USP, the volume
of traffic originating overseas is greater than the volume originating
in the U.S. When w < c the effects of the USP on U.S. profits are
uncertain. However, if U.S. inbound traffic is low enough relative to
its outbound traffic then the USP reduces the profits of U.S. firms.
It follows from Propositions 5 and 6 that, if y is small enough
relative to X, the USP reduces U.S. welfare. This can be seen with the
aid of Figure 6. When y is relatively large, equilibrium access
charges under the US? yield higher U.S. welfare (US 5 ) than
equilibrium in the unconstrained regime (USUR). As y becomes less
important, the iso-US contours eventually become negatively sloped
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(US1  and US in Figure 6). Since aM* eventually rises above aM itevntaly iss boeaU, i
follows from the negative slope of U.S. welfare contours that, as y
falls, the USP eventually reduces welfare.
While these conclusions are not as sharp as one would like, they
do give the policy maker some basis for judging the USP. In many telex
markets, most notably those of Western Europe, U.S. firms carry more
inbound than outbound traffic. Hence, Proposition 5 suggests that if
U.S. and foreign carriers share the same technology, the policy reduces
the price of final service; Proposition 6 suggests that it raises the
profits of U.S. carriers. Since European costs are probably fairly
close to those in the U.S., this model predicts that the USP has
probably raised welfare in European telex markets.
It is instructive to consider the important role in this result of
the 50-50 division of tolls. In the unconstrained regime, Bertrand-
U M
like competition drives a down to marginal cost, but a is greater
than marginal cost because the foreign monopolist has some bargaining
power in determining the price for access to its network. Consider the
effects of enforcing only the price discrimination constraint.
Proposition 3 argues that forbidding price discrimination allows the
monopolist exercise price leadership (i.e. charge aL) in the market for
access to its network. This is the worst possible scenario - the
monopolist has complete control over both the price it charges and the
price it pays U.S. firms. Enforcing the 50-50 division compels the
monopolist to consider how raising the access charge affects its own
marginal cost of outbound traffic. When it originates more traffic
then it receives the monopolist reduces the access charge to marginal
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cost.
Voice and telegraph markets are different stories altogether.
Propositions 5 and 6 suggest that the USP may reduce U.S. welfare in
many of these markets, since the volume of traffic from the U.S. to the
foreign country often exceeds the volume flowing in the opposite
direction. The likelihood that this occurs grows as U.S originated
traffic grows relative to that originated overseas.
Traffic disparities were quite large in the markets involved in
both the CONTELCA and CEPT telegrams. In the former, U.S. originated
traffic was over three times larger than traffic flowing in the
opposite direction for all countries except El Salvador. Similarly,
U.S. outbound traffic was double that of inbound traffic in many of the
CEPT countries. Unfortunately the model does not provide a simple
summary statistic saying how large the disparity must be for the policy
to reduce welfare.
In the Order on Reconsideration (FCC 1987), the FCC was careful to
point out that "uniformity is not an end in itself." They state that
"departures from uniformity are permissible if the particular departure
does not conflict with [the] objectives [for fair treatment of U.S.
carriers, and low rates for U.S. consumers]."26 The mechanism allowing
non-uniformity to occur is simple. The carrier desiring to operate at
a non-uniform rate applies to the Commission for a waiver of the
policy, and if the Commission takes no action after some amount of time
(60 days for telex and telegraph, 10 days for voice) the application is
granted.
While there are numerous examples of strong enforcement in telex
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and telegraph, the early indications are that the weaker stance adopted
toward voice is being born out in practice. Between 1985, the year MCI
and Sprint entered the voice market, and February 1987 the FCC received
37 applications for waiver of the USP for voice service to a total of
61 countries. None of those requests were opposed or even commented
upon.27 The "per se" approach adopted in telex and the "rule of
reason" approach adopted in voice are consistent with the model's
relatively sharp predictions for European telex, its ambiguous
predictions for voice. This same view, however, would recommend a rule
of reason approach in the telegraph market, an approach that has not
always been adopted there.
6. Concluding Comments
The main achievement of this paper is that it offers an
explanation of two apparent instances of price-setting behavior on the
part of foreign monopolists in the international telegraph market.
Casual arguments at the Commission seem to suggest that, in their view,
the uniform settlements policy makes it more difficult for the foreign
monopolist to "whipsaw" U.S. carriers. The model in this paper
predicts that just the opposite is true. That is, by constraining
agreements to be identical, the USP provides the foreign monopolist
with a credible commitment not to bargain with additional U.S. firms
after an initial agreement has been reached. Due to the bargaining
advantage it holds before reaching the first agreement, the monopolist
is thus able to credibly set a take-it or leave-it price.
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It should be clear that results in this paper extend to markets
other than those found in international telecommunications. In
particular, Proposition 3 has implications for the effects of
forbidding third degree price discrimination in many markets (i.e.
those satisfying assumptions 1 - 6) in which an upstream monopolist
bargains with downstream firms. In such markets, a rule forbidding
price discrimination can act as a credible commitment for the
monopolist not to place itself in a bilateral bargaining situation
after establishing price with one of the buyers. To the extent that
the monopolist has an advantage in negotiating the first price, this
commitment is likely to benefit the monopolist.
38
References
Binmore, K.G. (1986), "Nash Bargaining Theory I-III", in Binmore, K.G.
and P. Dasgupta eds. Essays in Bargaining Theory. London: Basil
Blackwell.
Binmore, K.G., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky. (1986), "The Nash
Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," Rand Journal of
Economics 17:2, 176-188.
Bulow, J. (1982), "Durable Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political
Economy, 90, 314-332.
Eward, R. (1985), The Deregulation of International
Telecommunications, Washington, D.C., Artech House Inc.
Gul, F., H. Sonnenschein and R. Wilson, (1986), "Foundations of Dynamic
Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory,
39, 120-154.
Katz, M.L. (1987), "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price
Discrimination in Intermediate Goods Markets," American Economic
Review, 77:1, 154-167.
Kwerel, E.R. (1984) "Promoting Competition Piecemeal in
International Telecommunications," FCC Office of Plans and Policy
Working Paper, no. 13.
Nash, J.F. (1950), "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, 18, 155-162.
O'Brien, D.P. (1988), "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of
Price Discrimination," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation,
Northwestern University.
O'Brien, D.P. (1989), "The Uniform Settlements Policy in International
Telecommunications: A Noncooperative Bargaining Approach," Mimeo.
Rubinstein, A. (1982), "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica 50, 97-109.
Rubinstein, A. and A. Wolinsky (1987), "Decentralized Trading,
Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome," Mimeo, University
of Pennsylvania.
Shaked, A. , and J. Sutton. (1984), "Involuntary Unemployment as a
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica 52,
1351-1364.
Snow, M.S. ed. (1986), Marketplace for Telecommunications:
Regulation and Deregulation in Industrialized Democracies,
39
New York, Longman.
Stokey, N. (1981) "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing,"
Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 112-128.
United States Federal Communications Commission (1985), "Implementation
and Scope of the Uniform Settlements Policy for Parallel Routes,"
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 85-204 (Released
July 3, 1985).
United States Federal communications Commission (1986), "Implementation
and Scope of the Uniform Settlements Policy for Parallel
International Communications Routes," Report and Order, CC Docket
No. 85-204, Rm-4796, FCC 86-30, (Released January 30, 1986).
United States Federal Communications Commission (1987), "Implementation
and Scope of the International Settlements Policy for Parallel
International Communications Routes," Order on Reconsideration, CC
Docket No. 85-204 (Released February 19, 1987).
United States Federal Communications Commission (1936), "In the Matter
of Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, Inc.," Docket Nos. 3336,
3337, and 3338. (Decided June 3, 1936).
United States Federal Communications Commission (1951), "In the Matter
of Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, Inc." Docket No. 8777,
(Decided February 21, 1951).
United States Federal Communications Commission (1977), "Uniform
Settlement Rates on Parallel International Communications Routes,"
Memorandum Opinion and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 77-369,
Docket No. 21265, (Released June 13, 1977).
United States Federal Communications Commission (1980), "Order in the




Proof of Lemma 2.
Suppose the constraint in problem (13) does not bind. Then
for all 6 < 1, firm i can reduce its offer below R by a small amount
while still satisfying the constraint. By Assumption 3 this increases
firm i's profits, contradicting the definition of R.
Next, suppose that for all w > 0, there exists some 6' c (1-o,1)
such that the constraint in problem (14) does not bind. This implies
that there is a sequence () -+ 1 such that 8Ui(S(aj),aj)/8a -O
for all St > 1-w, and therefore that aUi(S(a ),a )/Ba - 0.
I will show that this yields a contradiction.
In equilibrium, U is non-decreasing in a neighborhood below
both S and R; otherwise both the monopolist and firm i would want to
reduce price. Since the constraint in problem (13) binds, this
implies that S > R for 6 close to 1. Furthermore, by the continuity of
Ui and the fact that the constraint in problem (13) binds, either
U -+ 0, or S- +R as 6 -f1. But U -+O0 and Assumptionl1 together
imply that OUi/Bai 7 0, yielding a contradiction.
Suppose, then, that S -+ R. Expanding the right hand side (RHS)
of each constraint about the price on the LHS of that constraint and
rearranging the resulting expressions yields
(Al) Mj L> (S - R)






Ui(Riaj) 6 (S - R)
where t, v e [R,S]. Since S -+ R, t and v also converge to the same
price, call it a. Multiplying equation (Al) by (A2) and taking the
limit as 6 -+ 1 yields 0 > 1, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
there exists w such that the constraint in (14) binds for all
6 e (1-w,l).
Next, suppose that the constraint in (18) does not bind. Then
aU(a ,a,)/6a + [8U(aM,aM)/8a 2 ] T'(aM) - 0, which implies that
T'(a ) - -1 or 8U./ai - BU/8ai - 0. The former contradicts
Assumption 6, the latter contradicts the preceeding paragraph.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let U(a) - (1 - 6)U (a) + SU(a,a) and
r(a) - (1 - 6),rm(a) + Sir(a,a). Define,
C0 - the subgame beginning in any period t in which the monopolist
is about to propose a price,
G1 - the subgame beginning in any period t at the node in which
the monopolist decides whether to stay or switch,
G2 -the subgame beginning in any period t in which firm i is
about to propose a price.
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A - a there is a SPE in the game C in which the monopolist
receives U(a) in present value
and let mi - inf Ai, i e (0,1,2).
The method of proof is to show that m0 - aL , and therefore that
the only equilibrium to the game is that in which the monopolist
L
offers aL . The proof proceeds by first verifying three claims.
Claim 1. U(m 1 ) - max (6U(n 0 ) ,6U(m 2 )) .
Proof: The first term on the RHS of the equation is the least the
monopolist receives by switching; the second term is the least it
receives by staying. Since the monopolist can always guarantee itself
the maximum of these two by deciding whether to stay or switch, the
least it can possibly receive in any SPE to G1 is the maximum of these
two possibilities. Q.E.D.
Claim 2. U(m 2 ) s 651(m0 ).
Proof: Suppose a e A 0 , and let a' (a) be given by U(a' (a)) - 6U(a).
Consider the following strategies in G2: firm i offers a' (a), and the
monopolist accepts all offers greater than or equal to a'(a). If
agreement is not reached immediately then all players continue with
the strategies supporting the SPE outcome, a, in the subgame G0
beginning in the following period. These are SPE strategies. To see
this note that, by construction, the monopolist is indifferent between
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accepting or rejecting a'(a). And since U is nondecreasing, a'(a) s a,
which implies that firm i does worse by offering less than a' (a),
inducing the monopolist to reject. Hence, for all a e A 0 ,
U(a' (a)) - SU(a) implies that a'(a) e A 2 . In particular, a'(m 0 ) E A2
where U(a'(m 0 )) - 6U(m 0 ), and therefore U(m2 ) -SU(m 0 ) by the
definition of m2.
Claim 3. U(m ) - SU(m0 ). That is, the monopolist switches in the
equilibrium to G1 in which it receives U(m1 ).
Proof: Suppose U(m ) - U(m2 ), or that the monopolist does not switch.
Then, from Claim 2, U(m ) - SU(m2 ) s 6
2 1(m 0 ). This is a contradiction,
since the monopolist can always receive at least 6U(m 0 ) by switching.
Hence, the monopolist switches in the equilibrium to G1 in which it
receives U(m1 ). Q.E.D.
Claims 1 - 3 can now be used to prove the Proposition. Suppose
m0 < a 6 . Since the monopolist is switching, the most that firm i
can receive by rejecting an offer is 62 (m0 ) if it is the first to
agree to m0 in two periods. Therefore, the monopolist can guarantee
itself U(a) by offering a - argmax (U(a) | n(a) > 6r(m 0), a > c).
Since r is decreasing, either a > m0 , or m0 - a . The former case
cannot be true, since then there is not a SPE to GO in which the
monopolist receives an amount arbitrarily close to U(m0 ). Hence,
a -in 0 -6a Q.E.D.
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Notes
1."Order in the Matter of Preliminary Audit," Docket No. 20778,
released January 29, 1980, pp. 1-2. Eward (1985) and Snow (1986)
provide good summaries of other important changes occurring in
international telecommunications.
2.Readers familiar with the international telecommunications
settlements formula should note that under the USP what I term the
"access charge" is termed "one half the accounting rate" in policy
discussions. The accounting rate refers to the basic "unit of account"
from which carriers in particular country-pair markets determine the
access charge they pay. The "division of tolls" determines what share
of the accounting rate each country pays. For example, suppose the
accounting rate between the U.S. and France is $2.00, and the division
of tolls is 75-25 in favor of France. Then France pays the U.S. $.50
per call-minute for access to the U.S. network, while the U.S. pays
French Telecom $1.50 per call-minute for access to the French network.
In this terminology the USP requires all U.S. carriers to 1) agree t6
the same accounting rate and 2) agree to a 50-50 division of tolls. It
should be clear that the distinction is only in terminology, not in
substance.
3.See section 5 for a discussion of how the voice procedures are
currently enforced.
4.This is the approach taken, for example, by Katz (1987) in his
analysis of the welfare effects of intermediate product third degree
price discrimination.
5.See the section 5 for a discussion of how the rules have been relaxed




9.See, for example, FCC (1974) and (1977), where TRT Communications,
an international telex and telegraph carrier, was not allowed to
implement a lower non-uniform access charge for telex service between
the U.S. and the United Kingdom; see also FCC (1985), (1986), and
(1987) for other recent examples.
10.This has also been pointed out by Kwerel (1984).
11.COMTELCA (Comision Tecnica Regional de Telecomunicaciones) is
composed of the telecommunications administrations of Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The U.S. telegraph
45
carriers operating in these markets were Western Union International,
Western Union Telegraph Co., FTC Communications, ITT World
Communications, MCI International, RCA Global Communications, and TRT
Communications. See (FCC 1985, 28421).
12.FCC 1985, 28422.
13.While the average price per word for service to Costa Rica declined,
the price to the other four countries rose by an average of 5 percent
from 1982 to 1984.
14.CEPT (Conference European des Administrations des Postes et des
Telecommunications) is composed of 26 European PTTs. The countries
involved were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, West Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Yugoslavia.
15.FCC 1985, 28421.
16.It is straightforward to allow for more than two carriers in the
U.S.
17.The qualitative conclusions of this paper hold when this assumption
is relaxed. See O'Brien (1989).
18.In fact, there have been many cases in which U.S. carriers have
agreed to originate, but not terminate, traffic.
19.One could allow the monopolist or either buyer to choose to leave
the game at any time, but these strategies are strictly dominated by
choosing to continue bargaining.
20.See, for example, Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986).
21.It can be shown that this assumption holds when downstream demand is
linear.
22.There are also non-stationary asymmetric equilibria in which one
firm ends up paying a higher access charge than the other. Since U.S.
firms are symmetric in this model, the restriction to symmetric
equilibria seems natural. Intuitively, this amounts assuming that
"special relationships" of the type examined by Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987) do not form between the monopolist and either U.S. firm.
23. Firms in the industry have noted that carriers can add additional
capacity in a matter of weeks. See "Implementation and Scope...,
Report and Order", p. 4742.
24.The details can be found in O'Brien (1988) chapter 5, which is
available upon request .
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Subgame beginning with M's offer before any agreements
Subgame beginning with M['s decision whether to stay or
Subgame beginning with i's offer before any agreements



































US LIS is the equilibrium Iso-US contour under the ISP when "c ".4.

Recent CREST Working Papers
89-01: Mark Bagnoli, Severin Borenstein, "Carrot and Yardstick Regulation: Enhancing Market Perfor-
mance with Output Prizes," October, 1988.
89-02: Ted Bergstrom, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, "Some Simple Analytics of Peak-Load Pricing," October,
1988.
89-03: Ken Binmore, "Social Contract I: Harsanyi and Rawls," June, 1988.
89-04: Ken Binmore, "Social Contract II: Gauthier and Nash," June, 1988.
89-05: Ken Binmore, "Social Contract III: Evolution and Utilitarianism," June, 1988.
89-06: Ken Binmore, Adam Brandenburger, "Common Knowledge and Game Theory," July, 1989.
89-07: Jeffrey A. Miron, "A Cross Country Comparison of Seasonal Cycles and Business Cycles," November,
1988.
89-08: Jeffrey A. Miron, "The Founding of the Fed and the Destabilization of the Post-1914 Economy,"
August, 1988.
89-09: Gdrard Gaudet, Stephen W. Salant, "The Profitability of Exogenous Output Contractions: A
Comparative-Static Analysis with Application to Strikes, Mergers and Export Subsidies," July, 1988.
89-10: Gerard Gaudet, Stephen W. Salant, "Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old
Methods," August, 1988.
89-11: Hal R. Varian, "Goodness-of-fit in Demand Analysis," September, 1988.
89-12: Michelle J. White, "Legal Complexity," October, 1988.
89-13: Michelle J. White, "An Empirical Test of the Efficiency of Liability Rules in Accident Law," Novem-
ber, 1988.
89-14: Carl P. Simon, "Some Fine-Tuning for Dominant Diagonal Matrices," July, 1988.
89-15: Ken Binmore, Peter Morgan, "Do People Exploit Their Bargaining Power? An Experimental Study,"
January, 1989.
89-16: James A. Levinsohn, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, "A Simple, Consistent Estimator for Disturbance
Components in Financial Models," April 25, 1989.
89-17: Hal R. Varian, "Sequential Provision of Public Goods," July, 1989.
89-18: Hal R. Varian, "Monitoring Agents with Other Agents," June, 1989.
89-19: Robert C. Feenstra, James A. Levinsohn, "Distance, Demand, and Oligopoly Pricing," July 17, 1989.
89-20: Mark Bagnoli, Shaul Ben-David, Michael McKee, "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," August,
1989.
89-21: N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, Matthew D. Shapiro, "Stock Market Forecastability and Volatil-
ity: A Statistical Appraisal," August, 1989.
89-22: Arthur J. Robson, "Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake,"
1989.
89-23: Mark Bagnoli, Ted Bergstrom, "Log-Concave Probability and Its Applications," September 7, 1989.
89-24: Gdrard Gaudet, Stephen W. Salant, "Towards a Theory of Horizontal Mergers," July, 1989.
89-25 (evolved from 87-35): Stephen W. Salant, Eban Goodstein, "Predicting Committee Behavior in
Majority-Rule Voting Experiments," July, 1989.
89-26: Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein, "Noncooperative Models of Bargaining," 1989.
89-27: Avery Katz, "Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts," February 19,
1989.
Recent CREST Working Papers
90-01: Hal R. Varian, "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and Public Goods when Agents are
Well-Informed," January 17, 1990.
90-02: Hal R. Varian, "Sequential Provision of Public Goods," January 17, 1990.
90-03: Hal R. Varian, "Goodness-of-Fit Optimizing Models," December 11, 1989.
90-04: Paul N. Courant, Alan Deardorff, "International Trade with Lumpy Countries," August 22, 1989.
90-05: Dilip K. Bhattacharyya, Jan Kmenta, "Testing Hypotheses about Regression Coefficients in Misspec-
ified Models," December 15, 1989.
90-06: Greg Shaffer, "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating
Practices," November 1989.
90-07: Michelle J. White, "Why are Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits?" January 19, 1990.
90-08: Daniel P. O'Brien, "Endogenous Price Leadership: A Bargaining Model of International Telecommu-
nications Settlements," May 1989.
90-09: Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, "Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids," November
1989.
90-10: Ken Binrnore, "Bargaining Theory Without Tears," December 1, 1989.
90-11: Ilyun Song Shin, "Non-Partitional Information On Dynamic State Spaces and the Possibility of
Speculation," December 1989.


